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Analogy Making and the Structure of Implied Volatility Skew 
 
The existence of the implied volatility skew is perhaps one of the most intriguing anomalies in 
option markets. According to the Black-Scholes model (Black and Scholes (1973)), volatility inferred 
from prices (implied volatility) should not vary across strikes. In practice, a sharp skew in which 
implied volatilities fall monotonically as the ratio of strike to spot increases is observed in index 
options. 
 The Black-Scholes model assumes that an option can be perfectly replicated by a portfolio 
consisting of continuously adjusted proportions of the underlying stock and a risk-free asset. The 
cost of setting up this portfolio should equal the price of the option. Most attempts to explain the 
skew have naturally relaxed the assumption of perfect replication. Such relaxations have taken two 
broad directions: 1) Deterministic volatility models 2) Stochastic volatility models without jumps and 
stochastic volatility models with jumps. In the first category are the constant elasticity of variance 
model examined in Emanuel and Macbeth (1982), the implied binomial tree models of Dupire 
(1994), Derman and Kani (1994), and Rubinstein (1994). Dumas, Fleming and Whaley (1998) 
provide evidence that deterministic volatility models do not adequately explain the structure of 
implied volatility as they lead to parameters which are highly unstable through time. The second 
broad category is examined in papers by Chernov et al (2003), Anderson, Benzoni, and Lund (2002), 
Bakshi, Cao, and Chen (1997), Heston (1993), Stein and Stein (1991), and Hull and White (1987) 
among others. Bates (2000) presents empirical evidence regarding stochastic volatility models with 
and without jumps and finds that inclusion of jumps in a stochastic volatility model does improve 
the model, however, in order to adequately explain the skew, unreasonable parameter values are 
required. Empirical findings suggest that models with both stochastic volatility and jumps in returns 
fail to fully capture the empirical features of index returns and option prices (see Bakshi, Cao, and 
Chen (1997), Bates (2000), and Pan (2002)).  
 Highly relevant to the option pricing literature is the intriguing finding in Jackwerth (2000) 
that risk aversion functions recovered from option prices are irreconcilable with a representative 
investor. Perhaps, another line of inquiry is to acknowledge the importance of heterogeneous 
expectations and the impact of resulting demand pressures on option prices. Bollen and Whaley 
(2004) find that changes in implied volatility are directly related to net buying pressures from public 
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order flows. According to this view, different demands and supplies of different option series affect 
the skew. Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman (2007) examine option market activity of 
several classes of investors and highlight the salient features of option market activity. They find that 
a large percentage of calls are written as a part of covered call strategy. Covered call writing is a 
strategy in which a long position in the underlying stock is combined with a call writing position. 
This strategy is typically employed when one is expecting slow-to-moderate growth in the price of 
the underlying stock. It seems that call buyers expect higher returns from the underlying stock than 
call writers, but call writers are not pessimistic either. They expect slow/moderate growth and not a 
sharp downturn in the price of the underlying stock. 
 Should expectations regarding the underlying stock matter for option pricing? In the Black-
Scholes world where perfect replication is assumed, expectations do not matter as they do not affect 
the construction of the replicating portfolio or its dynamics. However, empirical evidence suggests 
that they do matter. Duan and Wei (2009) find that a variable closely related to the expected return 
on the underlying stock, its systematic risk proportion, is priced in individual equity options.  
There is also strong experimental and field evidence indicating that the expected return from 
the underlying stock matters for call option pricing. Rockenbach (2004), Siddiqi (2012), and Siddiqi 
(2011) find that participants in laboratory experiments seem to perceive the risk from a call option as 
similar to the risk from the underlying stock, and value a call option by equating its expected return 
to the expected return available on the underlying stock. Furthermore, a call option is commonly 
considered a surrogate for the underlying stock by many experienced option traders and analysts2 
suggesting strong field relevance of laboratory findings.  
The central prediction of asset pricing theory is: 
         
 
           
                                (0.1) 
Where    and    denote the return on a risky asset and the return on the risk free asset respectively. 
Equation (0.1) shows that the return that a subjective expected utility maximize expects from a risky 
                                                          
2
 As illustrative examples, see the following: http://ezinearticles.com/?Call-Options-As-an-Alternative-to-Buying-
the-Underlying-Security&id=4274772, http://www.investingblog.org/archives/194/deep-in-the-money-options/, 
http://www.triplescreenmethod.com/TradersCorner/TC052705.asp, 
http://daytrading.about.com/od/stocks/a/OptionsInvest.htm 
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asset depends on his belief about the covariance of the asset’s return with his marginal utility of 
consumption.  
An analogy maker is a subjective expected utility maximize who believes that the covariance of a call 
option’s return with his marginal utility of consumption is equal to the covariance of the underlying stock’s return with 
his marginal utility of consumption. Consequently, the return he expects from a call option is equal to his 
subjective assessment of the expected return available on the underlying stock. 
An analogy maker misperceives the quantity of risk in a call option to be equivalent to the 
quantity of risk in the underlying stock. One may re-write (0.1) as: 
        
  
              (0.2) 
Where    
               
             
  and    
             
           
 
 
Clearly, for a given subjective expected utility maximize, the (subjectively perceived) risk adjusted 
returns across all risky assets should be equal to  , which is his (subjective) price of risk. An analogy 
maker equates the perceived quantity of risk in a call option (measured by   of call) with the perceived 
quantity of risk in the underlying stock (measured by   of the underlying stock).  The argument that 
risks are commonly misperceived in various contexts is frequently made in the literature. See Rotheli 
(2010), Bhattacharya, Dana, & Sood (2009), Akerlof and Shiller (2009), and Barberis & Thaler (2002) 
among many others.  
This article explores the implications of confusing the call risk with the underlying stock’s 
risk for option pricing. It leads to a number of interesting findings: 1) a new explanation for the 
implied volatility skew puzzle, 2) an explanation for the superior historical performance of covered 
call writing, 3) an explanation for the worse-than-expected historical performance of zero-beta-
straddles, and 4) an explanation for recent empirical findings regarding leverage adjusted index 
option returns. Furthermore, the model predicts that average put returns (for options held to expiry) 
are more negative than what the Black Scholes model predicts. This is quite intriguing given the 
empirical findings that average put returns (for options held to expiry) are typically more negative 
than what the popular option pricing models suggest. See Chambers, Foy, Liebner, & Lu (2014) and 
references therein. With analogy making, average call returns are significantly smaller than Black 
Scholes prediction. Hence, the model also provides a potential explanation for the empirical findings 
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in Coval and Shumway (2001) that call return are a lot smaller than what they should be given their 
systematic risk. 
The first order condition of the subjective expected utility maximization involves equating  
               
             where    and     denote the price and the payoff from a risky asset 
respectively. Believing that the covariance of call’s return with marginal utility is equal to the 
covariance of underlying stock’s return with marginal utility implies that one overestimates  
                for a call option when compared with an investor with correct beliefs
3. For a 
given price, it follows that the quantity of call options demanded by an analogy maker is larger when 
compared with an investor with correct beliefs.  Hence, analogy making may be a source of demand 
pressures that Bollen and Whaley (2004) find important for explaining implied volatility.  
In a laboratory experiment, it is possible to objectively fix the expected return available on 
the underlying stock and make it common knowledge, however, in the real world; people are likely 
to have different subjective assessments of the expected return on the underlying stock. An analogy 
maker expects a return from a call option which is equal to his subjective assessment of the expected 
return available on the underlying stock. The marginal investor in a call option is perhaps more 
optimistic than the marginal investor in the corresponding underlying stock. To see this, consider 
the following:  In the market for the underlying stock, both the optimistic and pessimistic beliefs 
influence the belief of the marginal investor. Optimistic investors influence through demand 
pressure, whereas the pessimistic investors constitute the suppliers who influence through selling 
and short-selling. However, highly optimistic investors should favor a call option over its underlying 
stock due to the leverage embedded in the option. Furthermore, in the market for a call option, 
covered call writers are typical suppliers (see Lakonishok et al (2007)).  Covered call writers are 
neutral to moderately bullish (and not pessimistic) on the underlying stock.  Hence, due to the 
presence of relatively more optimistic buyers and sellers, the marginal investor in a call option is 
likely to be more optimistic about the underlying stock than the marginal investor in the underlying 
stock itself. Hence, the expected return reflected in a call option is likely to be larger than the 
expected return on the underlying stock. Also, as more optimistic buyers are likely to self-select into 
higher strike calls, the expected return may also rise with strike. 
                                                          
3
 With analogy making, the covariance of call option payoff with marginal utility takes a smaller negative value 
when compared with the corresponding covariance with correct beliefs.  
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If analogy makers influence call prices, shouldn’t a rational arbitrageur make money at their 
expense by taking an appropriate position in the call option and the corresponding replicating 
portfolio in accordance with the Black Scholes model? Such arbitraging is difficult if not impossible 
in the presence of transaction costs. Barberis and Thaler (2002) argue that the absence of “free 
lunch” does not imply that prices are right due to limits to arbitrage including transaction costs. In 
our context, the presence of transaction costs is likely to eliminate any “free lunch” at the expense of 
analogy makers. It is worth mentioning that bid-ask spreads in ATM index options are typically of 
the order of 3 to 5% of the option price, and spreads are typically 10% of the option price for deep 
OTM index options. 
In continuous time, no matter how small the transaction costs are, the total transaction cost 
of successful replication grows without bound rendering the Black-Scholes argument toothless. It is 
well known that there is no non-trivial portfolio that replicates a call option in the presence of 
transaction costs in continuous time. See Soner, Shreve, and Cvitanic (1995). In discrete time, 
transaction costs are bounded, however, a no-arbitrage interval is created. If analogy price lies within 
the interval, analogy makers cannot be arbitraged away. We show the conditions under which this 
happens in a binomial setting.  
Analogy making is complementary to the approaches developed earlier such as stochastic 
volatility and jump diffusion models. Such models specify certain dynamics for the underlying stock. 
The idea of analogy making is not wedded to a particular set of assumptions regarding the price and 
volatility processes of the underlying stock. It can be applied to a wide variety of settings. In this 
article, first we use the setting of a geometric Brownian motion. Then, we integrate analogy making 
with jump diffusion and stochastic volatility approaches. Combining analogy making and stochastic 
volatility leads to the skew even when there is zero correlation between the stock price and volatility 
processes, and combining analogy making with jump diffusion generates the skew without the need 
for asymmetric jumps. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 1 summarizes existing evidence pointing to 
analogy based call option pricing. Section 2 builds intuition by providing a numerical illustration of 
call option pricing with analogy making. Section 3 develops the idea in the context of a one period 
binomial model. Section 4 puts forward the analogy based option pricing formulas in continuous 
time. Section 5 shows that if analogy making determines option prices, and the Black-Scholes model 
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is used to back-out implied volatility, the skew arises, which flattens as time to expiry increases. 
Section 6 shows that the analogy model is consistent with key empirical findings regarding returns 
from covered call writing and zero-beta straddles. Section 7 shows that the analogy model is 
consistent with empirical findings regarding leverage adjusted option returns. Section 8 puts forward 
an analogy based option pricing model when the underlying stock returns exhibit stochastic 
volatility. It integrates analogy making with the stochastic volatility model developed in Hull and 
White (1987). Section 9 integrates analogy making with the jump diffusion approach of Merton 
(1976). Section 10 concludes. 
  
1. The Relevance of Analogy Making for Option Pricing 
 
A call option is commonly considered a surrogate for the underlying stock by investment 
professionals with decades of experience (see footnote 4 for five examples). A popular strategy 
advocated by market professionals is called the stock replacement strategy. In this strategy, underlying 
stocks are replaced by the corresponding call options in investment portfolios. The argument 
underlying this strategy is based on the similarity between call and underlying stock’s payoffs, and 
the fact that a call option is a lot cheaper than buying the underlying stock outright. A careful 
reading of the investment advice coming from proponents of the stock replacement strategy4 suggests 
the following: 1) Risk of buying a call option is frequently perceived not to be any larger than the 
risk of the underlying stock. Often, it is perceived to be smaller than the risk of the underlying stock 
because of smaller cash outlay. 2) Replacing stocks with call options is recommended as long as one 
expects at least the same return from the call as from the underlying stock. 
 Not only investment professionals with decades of experience consider a call option to be a 
surrogate for the underlying stock, participants in a series of laboratory experiments seem to think 
so too. Rockenbach (2004), Siddiqi (2012), and Siddiqi (2011) find that participants in laboratory 
                                                          
4
 As illustrative examples of this advice generated by investment professionals, see the following: 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/stock-replacement-strategy-reduce-risk-142949569.html 
http://ezinearticles.com/?Call-Options-As-an-Alternative-to-Buying-the-Underlying-Security&id=4274772, 
http://www.investingblog.org/archives/194/deep-in-the-money-options/ 
http://www.triplescreenmethod.com/TradersCorner/TC052705.asp, 
http://daytrading.about.com/od/stocks/a/OptionsInvest.htm 
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experiments apparently perceive the risk of call as equivalent to the risk of the underlying stock and 
value a call option by equating its expected return to the expected return available on the underlying 
stock.  
Apart from opinions of professionals and experimental evidence, there is also related 
empirical evidence suggesting that the expected return on the underlying stock matters for pricing 
options. Duan and Wei (2009) find that a variable closely related to the expected return on the 
underlying stock, its systematic risk proportion, is priced in individual equity options.  
Coval and Shumway (2001) find that the magnitudes of call option returns are too low given 
their systematic risk in the Black-Scholes/CAPM framework. Perhaps, this is due to analogy making 
as valuing a call option in analogy with its underlying stock significantly lowers the call option 
expected return, when compared with the expected return in the Black-Scholes/CAPM framework. 
 If analogy making influences the value of call options, what are the implications for put 
options? A call option can be converted into a put option by combining it with the short underlying 
stock plus a long position in the risk free bond (in accordance with put-call parity). In this article, the 
analogy based pricing formula for put options is deduced from analogy based call pricing formula by 
using put-call parity. Even though analogy is only explicitly made between a call option and its 
underlying stock, there are strong implications for put option pricing due to the model-free 
restriction of put-call parity. Empirically observed put option returns (for options held to expiry) are 
a lot more negative than what is expected from popular option pricing models. This fact is known in 
the literature as put option pricing puzzle and is well documented. See Chambers et al (2014) and 
references therein. Under analogy making, put option returns are significantly more negative than 
what is expected from the Black Scholes model. Hence, analogy making provides a potential 
explanation for the empirical findings.  
It has been argued in the cognitive science and psychology literature that when faced with a 
new situation, people instinctively search their memories for something similar they have seen 
before, and mentally co-categorize the new situation with the similar situations encountered earlier. 
This way of thinking, termed analogy making, is considered the core of cognition and the fuel and 
fire of thinking by prominent cognitive scientists and psychologists (see Hofstadter and Sander 
(2013)). Hofstadter and Sander (2013) write, “[…] at every moment of our lives, our concepts are selectively 
triggered by analogies that our brain makes without letup, in an effort to make sense of the new and unknown in terms 
of the old and known.” (Hofstadter and Sander (2013), Prologue page1). 
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As a call option’s payoffs are directly linked to the underlying stock’s payoffs, it is reasonable 
to think that a call option is mentally co-categorized with the underlying stock and their risks are 
considered similar. As mentioned earlier, this is what experienced traders as well as subjects in 
laboratory experiments seem to think. This article carefully explores the implications of such analogy 
making, and shows that analogy making provides a new explanation for the implied volatility skew 
puzzle. The analogy model also provides new explanations for the puzzling historical profitability of 
covered call strategy, and worse-than-expected performance of zero-beta straddles. Furthermore, the 
model is consistent with recent empirical findings regarding leverage adjusted option returns.  
 
 
2. Analogy Making: A Numerical Illustration 
 
Consider an investor in a two state-two asset complete market world with one time period marked 
by two points in time: 0 and 1. The two assets are a stock (S) and a risk-free zero coupon bond (B). 
The stock has a price of $140 today (time 0). Tomorrow (time 1), the stock price could either go up 
to $200 (the red state) or go down to $94 (the blue state). Each state has a 50% chance of occurring. 
There is a riskless bond (zero coupon) that has a price of $100 today. Its price stays at $100 at time 1 
implying a risk free rate of zero. Suppose a new asset “A” is introduced to him. The asset “A” pays 
$100 in cash in the red state and nothing in the blue state. How much should the investor be willing 
to pay for this new asset? 
 Finance theory provides an answer by appealing to the principle of no-arbitrage: assets with 
identical state-wise payoffs must have the same price or equivalently assets with identical state-wise payoffs must have 
the same state-wise returns. Consider a portfolio consisting of a long position in 0.943396 of S and a 
short position in 0.886792 of B. In the red state, 0.943396 of S pays $188.6792 and one has to pay 
$88.6792 due to shorting of 0.886792 of B earlier resulting in a net payoff of $100. In the blue state, 
0.943396 of S pays $88.6792 and one has to pay $88.6792 on account of shorting 0.886792 of B 
previously resulting in a net payoff of 0. That is, payoffs from 0.943396S-0.886792B are identical to 
payoffs from “A”. As the cost of 0.943396S-0.886792B is $43.39623, it follows that the no-arbitrage 
price for “A” is $43.39623. 
 When simple tasks such as the one described above are presented to participants in a series 
of experiments, instead of the no-arbitrage argument, they seem to rely on analogy-making to figure 
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out their willingness to pay. See Rockenbach (2004), Siddiqi (2011), and Siddiqi (2012). Instead of 
trying to construct a replicating portfolio which is identical to asset “A”, people find an actual asset 
similar to “A” and price “A” in analogy with that asset.   
Asset “A” is similar to asset S as their payoffs are strongly related. In fact, asset “A” is 
equivalent to a call option on “S” with a strike price of $100. If the risk of “A’ is perceived to be 
equal to the risk of “S”, their expected returns should be equal. Expected return from S is 1.05 
 
              
   
 . A’s value should be such that it offers the same expected return as S. That is, 
analogy makers value “A” at $47.61905. 
In the above example, there is a gap of $4.22281 between the no-arbitrage price and the 
analogy price.  Rational investors should short “A” and buy “0.943396S-0.886792B”. However, 
transaction costs are ignored in the example so far.  
Let’s see what happens when a symmetric proportional transaction cost of only 1% of the 
price is applied when assets are traded. That is, both a buyer and a seller pay a transaction cost of 1% 
of the price of the asset traded. Unsurprisingly, the composition of the replicating portfolio changes. 
To successfully replicate a long call option that pays $100 in cash in the red state and 0 in the blue 
state with transaction cost of 1%, one needs to buy 0.952925 of S and short 0.878012 of B. In the 
red state, 0.952925S yields $188.6792 net of transaction cost                        , and 
one has to pay $88.6792 to cover the short position in B created earlier               
         . Hence, the net cash generated by liquidating the replicating portfolio at time 1 is $100 
in the red state. In the blue state, the net cash from liquidating the replicating portfolio is 0. Hence, 
with a symmetric and proportional transaction cost of 1%, the replicating portfolio is “0.952925S-
0.878012B”. The cost of setting up this replicating portfolio inclusive of transaction costs at time 0 
is $47.82044, which is larger than the price the analogy makers are willing to pay: $47.61905. Hence, 
arbitrage profits cannot be made at the expense of analogy makers by writing a call and buying the 
replicating portfolio. The given scheme cannot generate arbitrage profits unless the call price is 
greater than $47.82044 
Suppose one in interested in doing the opposite. That is, buy a call and short the replicating 
portfolio to fund the purchase. Continuing with the same example, the relevant replicating portfolio 
(that generates an outflow of $100 in the red state and 0 in the blue state) is “-0.934056S 
+0.89575B”. The replicating portfolio generates $41.1928 at time 0, which leaves $38.98937 after 
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time 0 transaction costs in setting up the portfolio are paid. Hence, in order for the scheme to make 
money, one needs to buy a call option at a price less than $38.98937. 
 Effectively, transaction costs create a no-arbitrage interval                    . As the 
analogy price lies within this interval, arbitrage profits cannot be made at the expense of analogy 
makers in the example considered. 
 
 
2.1 Analogy Making: A Two Period Binomial Example with Delta Hedging 
 
Consider a two period binomial model. The parameters are: Up factor=2, Down factor=0.5, Current 
stock price=$100, Risk free interest rate per binomial period=0, Strike price=$30, and the 
probability of up movement=0.5. It follows that the expected gross return from the stock per 
binomial period is 1.25 (              . 
 The call option can be priced both via analogy as well as via no-arbitrage argument. The no-
arbitrage price is denoted by    whereas the analogy price is denoted by   . Define    
   
  
 and 
   
   
  
 where the differences are taken between the possible next period values that can be 
reached from a given node. 
Figure 1 shows the binomial tree and the corresponding no-arbitrage and analogy prices. 
Two things should be noted. Firstly, in the binomial case considered, before expiry, the analogy 
price is always larger than the no-arbitrage price. Secondly, the delta hedging portfolios in the two 
cases        and        grow at different rates. The portfolio        grows at the rate 
equal to the expected return on stock per binomial period (which is 1.25 in this case). In the analogy 
case, the value of delta-hedging portfolio when the stock price is 100 is 17.06667      
             . In the next period, if the stock price goes up to 200, the value becomes 21.33333 
                 . If the stock price goes down to 50, the value also ends up being equal to 
21.33333                .  That is, either way, the rate of growth is the same and is equal to 
1.25 as                      . Similarly, if the delta hedging portfolio is constructed at any 
other node, the next period return remains equal to the expected return from stock. It is easy to 
verify that the portfolio        grows at a different rate which is equal to the risk free rate per 
binomial period (which is 0 in this case). 
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Put option values can be calculated easily via put-call parity. It is easy to check that the 
expected return from a put option (held to expiry) in this case has a value of -89.224% under 
analogy making. The corresponding value under portfolio replication is -43.75%. In general, under 
analogy making, expected return from a put option (held to expiry) is significantly more negative 
then what is expected from the Black Scholes model. 
In the next section, implications of analogy making are explored in a general binomial model, 
which helps in building intuition before discussing the continuous time case. 
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3. Analogy Making: The Binomial Case 
Consider a two state world. The equally likely states are Red, and Blue. There is a stock with prices 
          corresponding to states Red, and Blue respectively, where      . The state realization 
takes place at time  . The current time is time  . We denote the risk free discount rate by  . That is, 
there is a riskless zero coupon bond that has a price of B in both states with a price of 
 
   
 today. 
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that     and      . The current 
price of the stock is   such that         . We further assume that   
     
 
  That is, the stock 
price reflects a positive risk premium. In other words,     
     
 
 where   
 
     
.5   is the risk 
premium reflected in the price of the stock.6 As we have assumed    , it follows that   
 
   
. 
Suppose a new asset which is a European call option on the stock is introduced. By 
definition, the payoffs from the call option in the two states are: 
                                                                                                                   
Where   is the striking price, and             are the payoffs from the call option corresponding to 
Red, and Blue states respectively. 
How much is an analogy maker willing to pay for this call option? 
There are two cases in which the call option has a non-trivial price: 1)         and 2)    
     
The analogy maker infers the price of the call option,    , by equating the expected return from the 
call to the return he expects from holding the underlying stock: 
               
    
  
             
   
                                                                                       
 
                                                          
5
 In general, a stock price can be expressed as a product of a discount factor and the expected payoff if it follows a 
binomial process in discrete time (as assumed here), or if it follows a geometric Brownian motion in continuous 
time. 
6
 If the marginal call investor is more optimistic than the marginal stock investor, they would perceive different 
values of   and    so that their assessment of   is different accordingly. 
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For case 1 (        ), one can write:  
   
     
     
   
        
  
     
                                                                                                                              
Substituting     
     
 
  in (3.3): 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The above equation is the one period analogy option pricing formula for the binomial case when call 
remains in-the-money in both states. 
The corresponding no-arbitrage price    is (from the principle of no-arbitrage): 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
For case 2 (        , the analogy price is: 
     
  
     
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
And, the corresponding no-arbitrage price is: 
   
    
     
                                                                                                                                         
 
Proposition 1 The analogy price is larger than the corresponding no-arbitrage price if a 
positive risk premium is reflected in the price of the underlying stock and there are no 
transaction costs. 
Proof. 
See Appendix A ▄ 
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Suppose there are transaction costs, denoted by “c”, which are assumed to be symmetric and 
proportional. That is, if the stock price is S, a buyer pays        and a seller receives       . 
Similar rule applies when the bond or the option is traded. That is, if the bond price is B, a buyer 
pays         and a seller receives       . We further assume that the call option is cash settled. 
That is, there is no physical delivery. 
Introduction of the transaction cost does not change the analogy price as the expected 
returns on call and on the underlying stock are proportionally reduced. However, the cost of 
replicating a call option changes. The total cost of successfully replicating a long position in the call 
option by buying the appropriate replicating portfolio and then liquidating it in the next period to 
get cash (as call is cash settled) is: 
 
    
     
  
 
   
 
  
   
    
 
   
 
  
   
                                                                 
 
 
   
 
 
   
    
 
   
 
 
   
                                                                                     
The corresponding inflow from shorting the appropriate replicating portfolio to fund the 
purchase of a call option is: 
 
    
     
  
 
   
 
  
   
    
 
   
 
  
   
                                                                 
 
 
   
 
 
   
    
 
   
 
 
   
                                                                                     
Proposition 2 shows that if transaction costs exist and the risk premium on the underlying stock is 
within a certain range, the analogy price lies within the no-arbitrage interval. Hence, riskless profit 
cannot be earned at the expense of analogy makers.  
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Proposition 2 In the presence of symmetric and proportional transaction costs, analogy 
makers cannot be arbitraged out of the market if the risk premium on the underlying stock 
satisfies: 
    
          
        
 
  
     
                                                                                
     
    
    
        
 
                                 
    
                   
   
                                                                                                                                                    
Proof. 
See Appendix B 
▄ 
 
Intuitively, when transaction costs are introduced, there is no unique no-arbitrage price. Instead, a 
whole interval of no-arbitrage prices comes into existence. Proposition 2 shows that for reasonable 
parameter values, the analogy price lies within this no-arbitrage interval in a one period binomial 
model. As more binomial periods are added, the transaction costs increase further due to the need 
for additional re-balancing of the replicating portfolio. In the continuous limit, the total transaction 
cost is unbounded. Reasonably, arbitrageurs cannot make money at the expense of analogy makers 
in the presence of transaction costs ensuring that the analogy makers survive in the market. 
 It is interesting to consider the rate at which the delta-hedged portfolio grows under analogy 
making. Proposition 3 shows that under analogy making, the delta-hedged portfolio grows at a rate 
 
 
      . This is in contrast with the Black Scholes Merton/Binomial Model in which the 
growth rate is equal to the risk free rate,  . 
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Proposition 3 If analogy making determines the price of the call option, then the 
corresponding delta-hedged portfolio grows with time at the rate of  
 
 
  . 
Proof. 
 
See Appendix C 
▄ 
 
Corollary 3.1 If there are multiple binomial periods then the growth rate of the delta-hedged 
portfolio per binomial period is 
 
 
  . 
 
In continuous time, the difference in the growth rates of the delta-hedged portfolio under analogy 
making and under the Black Scholes/Binomial model leads to an option pricing formula under 
analogy making which is different from the Black Scholes formula. The continuous time formula is 
presented in the next section.  
 
 
4. Analogy Making: The Continuous Case 
  
We maintain all the assumptions of the Black-Scholes model except one. We allow for proportional 
transaction costs whereas the transaction costs are ignored in the Black-Scholes model. As is well 
known, introduction of the transaction costs invalidates the replication argument underlying the 
Black Scholes formula. See Soner, Shreve, and Cvitanic (1995). As seen in the last section, 
proportional transaction costs have no bearing on the analogy argument as they simply reduce the 
expected return on the call and on the underlying stock proportionally.  
Proposition 4 shows the analogy based partial differential equation under the assumption 
that the underlying follows geometric Brownian motion, which is the limiting case of the discrete 
binomial model. We also explicitly allow for the possibility that different marginal investors 
determine prices of calls with different strikes. This is reasonable as call buying is a bullish strategy 
with more optimistic buyers likely self-selecting into higher strikes. 
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Proposition 4 If analogy makers set the price of a European call option, the analogy option 
pricing partial differential Equation (PDE) is  
        
  
  
 
  
  
        
   
   
    
 
 
Where    is the risk premium that a marginal investor in the call option with strike ‘K’ 
expects from the underlying stock. 
Proof. 
See Appendix D 
 ▄ 
 
Just like the Black Scholes PDE, the analogy option pricing PDE can be solved by transforming it 
into the heat equation. Proposition 5 shows the resulting call option pricing formula for European 
options without dividends under analogy making. 
 
Proposition 5 The formula for the price of a European call is obtained by solving the 
analogy based PDE. The formula is            
             where    
              
  
 
      
     
 and    
   
 
 
        
  
 
      
     
 
Proof. 
See Appendix E. 
▄ 
Corollary 5.1 The formula for the analogy based price of a European put option is  
                                    
Proof. Follows from put-call parity.  
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As proposition 5 shows, the analogy formula is exactly identical to the Black Scholes formula except 
for the appearance of   , which is the risk premium that a marginal investor in the call option with 
strike K expects from the underlying stock. Note, that full allowance is made for the possibility that 
such expectations vary with strike price as more optimistic investors are likely to self-select into 
higher strike calls. 
 It is interesting to analyze put option returns under analogy making. Proposition 6 shows 
that put option returns are more negative under analogy making when compared with put option 
returns in the Black Scholes model. 
 
Proposition 6 Expected put option returns (for options held to expiry) under analogy 
making are more negative than expected put option returns in the Black Scholes model as 
long as the underlying stock has a positive risk premium. 
Proof.  
Follows directly from realizing that if the risk premium on the underlying is positive: 
1) the price of a put option under analogy making is larger than the price of a put option in the 
Black Scholes model, and 2) average put returns are negative. 
▄ 
 
Proposition 6 is quite intriguing given the puzzling nature of empirical put option returns when 
compared with the predictions of popular option pricing models. Chambers et al (2014) analyze 
nearly 25 years of put option data and conclude that average put returns are, in general, significantly 
more negative than the predictions of Black Scholes, Heston stochastic volatility, and Bates SVJ 
model. Hence, analogy making offers a potential explanation. Clearly, expected call return under 
analogy making is a lot less than what is expected under the Black Scholes model. Empirical call 
returns are found to be a lot smaller given the predictions of the Black Scholes model (see Coval and 
Shumway (2001)). This consistency in the direction of returns in the analogy model for put and call 
options, and empirical findings is quite intriguing. 
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5. The Implied Volatility Skew 
If analogy making determines option prices (formulas in proposition 5), and the Black Scholes 
model is used to infer implied volatility, the skew is observed. Table 1 shows two examples of this. 
In the illustration titled “IV-Homogeneous Expectation”, the perceived risk premium on the 
underlying stock does not vary with the striking price. The other parameters are:        
                         . In the illustration titled “IV-Heterogeneous Expectations”, 
the risk premium on the underlying stock is varied by 40 basis points for every 0.01 change in 
moneyness. That is, for a change of $5 in strike, the risk premium increases by 200 basis points. This 
captures the possibility that more optimistic investors self-select into higher strike calls. Other 
parameters are kept the same. 
 
Table 1 
The Implied Volatility Skew 
IV-Heterogeneous Expectations IV-Homogeneous Expectations 
K/S Risk 
Premium 
Black 
Scholes 
Analogy 
Price 
Implied 
Vol. 
Implied 
Vol. – 
Historical 
Vol. 
Risk 
Premium 
Implied 
Vol. 
Implied Vol. – 
Historical Vol. 
0.9 10% 10.21 10.93 36.34% 16.34% 10% 36.34% 16.34% 
0.95 12% 5.69 6.47 29.33% 9.33% 10% 27.87% 7.87% 
1.0 14% 2.37 2.985 25.4% 5.4% 10% 23.78% 3.78% 
1.1 18% 0.129 0.231 22.74% 2.74% 10% 21.46% 1.46% 
 
 
As Table 1 shows, the implied volatility skew can be observed with both homogeneous and 
heterogeneous expectations. It also shows that the difference between implied volatility and realized 
volatility is higher with heterogeneous expectations. It is easy to see that higher the dispersion in 
beliefs, greater is the difference between implied and realized volatilities (as long as more optimistic 
investors self-select into higher strike calls). This is consistent with empirical evidence that shows 
that higher the dispersion in beliefs, greater is the difference between implied and realized volatilities 
(see Beber A., Breedan F., and Buraschi A. (2010)). Figure 2 is a graphical illustration of Table 1. 
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Figure 2 
It is easy to illustrate that, with analogy making, the implied volatility skew gets flatter as time to 
expiry increases. As an example, with underlying stock price=$100, volatility=20%, risk premium on 
the underlying stock=5%, and the risk free rate of 0, the flattening with expiry can be seen in Figure 
3. Hence, the implications of analogy making are consistent with key observed features of the 
structure of implied volatility skew.  
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Figure 3 
As an illustration of the fact that implied volatility curve flattens with expiry, Figure 4 is a 
reproduction of a chart from Fouque, Papanicolaou, Sircar, and Solna (2004) (Figure 2 from their 
paper). It plots implied volatilities from options with at least two days and at most three months to 
expiry. The flattening is clearly seen. 
 
Figure 4 Implied volatility as a function of moneyness on January 12, 2000, for options with at least two days and 
at most three months to expiry. 
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So far, we have only considered analogy making as the sole mechanism generating the skew. 
Stochastic volatility and jump diffusion are other popular methods that give rise to the skew. In 
sections 8 and 9, we show that analogy making is complementary to stochastic volatility and jump 
diffusion models by integrating analogy making with the models of Hull and White (1987) and 
Merton (1976) respectively. In the next section, the profitability of covered call writing and zero-beta 
straddles is examined in the analogy model.  
 
6. The Profitability of Covered Call Writing with Analogy Making 
The profitability of covered call writing is quite puzzling in the Black Scholes framework. Whaley 
(2002) shows that BXM (a Buy Write Monthly Index tracking a Covered Call on S&P 500) has 
significantly lower risk when compared with the index, however, it offers nearly the same return as 
the index. Similar conclusions are reached in studies by Feldman and Roy (2004) and Callan 
Associates (2006). In the Black Scholes framework, the covered call strategy is expected to have 
lower risk as well as lower return when compared with buying the index only. See Black (1975). In 
fact, in an efficient market, the risk adjusted return from covered call writing should be no different 
than the risk adjusted return from just holding the index. 
The covered call strategy (S denotes stock, C denotes call) is given by: 
      
With analogy making, this is equal to: 
          
                     
    
           
         
                      (6.1) 
The corresponding value under the Black Scholes assumptions is: 
                    
               (6.2) 
 A comparison of 6.1 and 6.2 shows that covered call strategy is expected to perform much 
better with analogy making when compared with its expected performance in the Black Scholes 
world. With analogy making, covered call strategy creates a portfolio with a weight of       
   on 
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the stock and a weight of     
   on a hypothetical risk free asset with a return of     . The stock 
has a return of     plus dividend yield. This implies that, with analogy making, the return from 
covered call strategy is expected to be comparable to the return from holding the underlying stock 
only. The presence of a hypothetical risk free asset in 6.1 implies that the standard deviation of 
covered call returns is lower than the standard deviation from just holding the underlying stock. 
Hence, the superior historical performance of covered call strategy is no mystery if call prices are 
determined via analogy making. 
 
6.1 The Zero-Beta Straddle Performance with Analogy Making 
Another empirical puzzle in the Black-Scholes/CAPM framework is that zero beta straddles lose 
money. Goltz and Lai (2009), Coval and Shumway (2001) and others find that zero beta straddles 
earn negative returns on average. This is in sharp contrast with the Black-Scholes/CAPM prediction 
which says that the zero-beta straddles should earn the risk free rate. A zero-beta straddle is 
constructed by taking a long position in corresponding call and put options with weights chosen so 
as to make the portfolio beta equal to zero: 
                     
    
     
          
 
Where             
     
    
        and                
     
   
        
 It is straightforward to show that with analogy making, where call and put prices are 
determined in accordance with proposition 5, the zero-beta straddle earns a significantly smaller 
return than the risk free rate (with returns being negative for a wide range of realistic parameter 
values). See Appendix H for proof. Intuitively, with analogy making, both call and put options are 
more expensive when compared with Black-Scholes prices. Hence, the returns are smaller.  
Analogy based option pricing not only generates the implied volatility skew, it is also 
consistent with key empirical findings regarding option portfolio returns such as covered call writing 
and zero-beta straddles. 
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7. Leverage Adjusted Option Returns with Analogy Making 
Leverage adjustment dilutes beta risk of an option by combining it with a risk free asset. Leverage 
adjustment combines each option with a risk-free asset in such a manner that the overall beta risk 
becomes equal to the beta risk of the underlying stock. The weight of the option in the portfolio is 
equal to its inverse price elasticity w.r.t the underlying stock’s price: 
 
            
             
                                                                             
where   
     
      
 
     
    
 (i.e price elasticity of call w.r.t the underlying stock) 
               
            
                                                                                                                                
 
 Constantinides, Jackwerth and Savov (2013) uncover a number of puzzling empirical facts 
regarding leverage adjusted index option returns. They find that over a period ranging from April 
1986 to January 2012, the average percentage monthly returns of leverage-adjusted index call and put 
options are decreasing in the ratio of strike to spot.  They also find that leverage adjusted put returns are larger than 
the corresponding leverage adjusted call returns. The empirical findings in Contantinides et al (2012) are 
inconsistent with the Black-Scholes/CAPM framework, which predicts that the leverage adjusted 
returns should be equal to the return from the underlying index. That is, they should not fall with 
strike, and the leverage adjusted put option returns should not be any different than the leverage 
adjusted call returns. 
 If analogy making determines call prices, then the behavior of leverage adjusted call and put 
returns should be a lot different than their predicted behavior under the Black-Scholes assumptions. 
For call options: 
 
    
 
  
 
     
 
                                                                                                (7.1) 
where              
  
  
 
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                     (7.2) 
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According to the analogy based PDE: 
 
       
  
  
 
  
  
       
   
   
    
 
                                                                 (7.3) 
 
Substituting (7.3) and (7.2) in (7.1) and simplifying leads to: 
 
                                             (7.4) 
 
  rises as the ratio of strike to spot increases. So, the leverage adjusted call option return must fall as 
the ratio of strike to spot increases. Hence, analogy based option pricing is consistent with empirical 
evidence. The corresponding leverage adjusted put option return with analogy based option pricing 
is: 
                                 
   
          
      (7.5) 
The term in brackets, 
   
          
, falls as the ratio of strike to spot increases. Furthermore, (7.5) is 
larger than (7.4). That is, the leverage adjusted put returns must fall as the ratio of strike to spot 
increases and are also larger than the corresponding leverage adjusted call returns. Hence, empirical 
findings in Constantinides et al (2012) regarding leverage adjusted option returns are consistent with 
analogy based option pricing. 
 
8. Analogy based Option Pricing with Stochastic Volatility 
In this section, we put forward an analogy based option pricing model for the case when the 
underlying stock price and its instantaneous variance are assumed to obey the uncorrelated 
stochastic processes described in Hull and White (1987): 
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Where      (Instantaneous variance of stock’s returns), and   and   are non-negative constants. 
   and    are standard Guass-Weiner processes that are uncorrelated. Time subscripts in   and   
are suppressed for notational simplicity. If    , then the instantaneous variance is a constant, and 
we are back in the Black-Scholes world. Bigger the value of  , which can be interpreted as the 
volatility of volatility parameter, larger is the departure from the constant volatility assumption of the 
Black-Scholes model. 
Hull and White (1987) is among the first option pricing models that allowed for stochastic 
volatility. A variety of stochastic volatility models have been proposed including Stein and Stein 
(1991), and Heston (1993) among others. Here, we use Hull and White (1987) assumptions to show 
that the idea of analogy making is easily combined with stochastic volatility. Clearly, with stochastic 
volatility it does not seem possible to form a hedge portfolio that eliminates risk completely. This is 
because there is no asset which is perfectly correlated with     . 
If analogy making determines call prices and the underlying stock and its instantaneous 
volatility follow the stochastic processes described above, then the European call option price (no 
dividends on the underlying stock for simplicity) must satisfy the partial differentiation equation 
given below (see Appendix F for the derivation): 
  
  
       
  
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
    
   
   
 
 
 
    
   
   
                                                   
Where   is the risk premium that a marginal investor in the call option expects to get from the 
underlying stock. 
 By definition, under analogy making, the price of the call option is the expected terminal 
value of the option discounted at the rate which the marginal investor in the option expects to get 
from investing in the underlying stock. The price of the option is then: 
       
                         
              
                                                                       
Where the conditional distribution of    as perceived by the marginal investor is such that 
          
      
           and        
     is           .  
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 By defining    
 
   
   
   
 
 
 as the means variance over the life of the option, the 
distribution of    can be expressed as: 
          
                         
                                                                                             
Substituting (8.3) in (8.2) and re-arranging leads to: 
       
                                                  
                                             
By using an argument that runs in parallel with the corresponding argument in Hull and White 
(1987), it is straightforward to show that the term inside the square brackets is the analogy making 
price of the call option with a constant variance   . Denoting this price by           , the price of 
the call option under analogy making when volatility is stochastic (as in Hull and White (1987)) is 
given by (proof available from author): 
       
                          
                                                                                               
Where                 
                    
   
  
  
   
 
 
       
  
 
      
     
 ;   
  
   
 
 
       
  
 
      
     
 
Equation (8.5) shows that the analogy based call option price with stochastic volatility is the analogy 
based price with constant variance integrated with respect to the distribution of mean volatility.  
 
8.1 Option Pricing Implications 
Stochastic volatility models require a strong correlation between the volatility process and the stock 
price process in order to generate the implied volatility skew. They can only generate a more 
symmetric U-shaped smile with zero correlation as assumed here. In contrast, the analogy making 
stochastic volatility model (equation 8.5) can generate a variety of skews and smiles even with zero 
correlation. What type of implied volatility structure is ultimately seen depends on the parameters   
and  . It is easy to see that if     and    , only the implied volatility skew is generated, and if 
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    and    , only a more symmetric smile arises. For positive  , there is a threshold value of   
below which skew arises and above which smile takes shape. Typically, for options on individual 
stocks, the smile is seen, and for index options, the skew arises. The approach developed here 
provides a potential explanation for this as   is likely to be lower for indices due to inbuilt 
diversification (giving rise to skew) when compared with individual stocks. 
 
9. Analogy based Option Pricing with Jump Diffusion 
In this section, we integrate the idea of analogy making with the jump diffusion model of Merton 
(1976). As before, the point is that the idea of analogy making is independent of the distributional 
assumptions that are made regarding the behavior of the underlying stock. In the previous section, 
analogy making is combined with the Hull and White stochastic volatility model to illustrate the 
same point.   
Merton (1976) assumes that the stock returns are a mixture of geometric Brownian motion and 
Poisson-driven jumps: 
                     
Where    is a standard Guass-Weiner process, and      is a Poisson process.    and    are 
assumed to be independent.   is the mean number of jump arrivals per unit time,          
where     is the random percentage change in the stock price if the Poisson event occurs, and   
is the expectations operator over the random variable  . If     (hence,     ) then the stock 
price dynamics are identical to those assumed in the Black Scholes model. For simplicity, assume 
that       .  
The stock price dynamics then become: 
                
 Clearly, with jump diffusion, the Black-Scholes no-arbitrage technique cannot be employed 
as there is no portfolio of stock and options which is risk-free. However, with analogy making, the 
price of the option can be determined as the return on the call option demanded by the marginal 
investor is equal to the return he expects from the underlying stock. 
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 If analogy making determines the price of the call option when the underlying stock price 
dynamics are a mixture of a geometric Brownian motion and a Poisson process as described earlier, 
then the following partial differential equation must be satisfied (see Appendix G for the derivation): 
  
  
       
  
  
 
 
 
    
   
   
                                                                 
   If the distribution of   is assumed to log-normal with a mean of 1 (assumed for simplicity) 
and a variance of     then by using an argument analogous to Merton (1976), the following analogy 
based option pricing formula for the case of jump diffusion is easily derived (proof available from 
author): 
      
                
 
  
 
   
                                                                                  
                              
                    
   
  
  
   
 
        
  
 
  
     
      
           
  
   
 
        
  
 
  
     
      
 
          
 
   
   and    
   
 
 
Where   is the fraction of volatility explained by jumps. 
The formula in (9.2) is identical to the Merton jump diffusion formula except for one parameter,  , 
which is the risk premium that a marginal investor in the call option expects from the underlying 
stock. 
 
9.1 Option Pricing Implications 
Merton’s jump diffusion model with symmetric jumps (jump mean equal to zero) can only produce a 
symmetric smile. Generating the implied volatility skew requires asymmetric jumps (jump mean 
becomes negative) in the model. However, with analogy making, both the skew and the smile can be 
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generated even when jumps are symmetric. In particular, for low values of  , a more symmetric 
smile is generated, and for larger values of    skew arises. 
 Even if we one assumes an asymmetric jump distribution around the current stock price, 
Merton formula, when calibrated with historical data, generates a skew which is a lot less 
pronounced (steep) than what is empirically observed. See Andersen and Andreasen (2002). The 
skew generated by the analogy formula (with asymmetric jumps) is typically more pronounced 
(steep) when compared with the skew without analogy making. Hence, analogy making potentially 
adds value to a jump diffusion model. 
 
10. Conclusions 
The observation that people tend to think by analogies and comparisons has important implications 
for option pricing that are thus far ignored in the literature. Prominent cognitive scientists argue that 
analogy making is the way human brain works (Hofstadter and Sander (2013)). There is strong 
experimental evidence that a call option is valued in analogy with the underlying stock (see 
Rockenbach (2004), Siddiqi (2012), and Siddiqi (2011)). A call option is commonly considered to be 
a surrogate for the underlying stock by experienced market professionals, which lends further 
support to the idea of analogy based option valuation. In this article, the notion that a call option is 
valued in analogy with the underlying stock (call risk is perceived as similar to the underlying stock 
risk) is explored and the resulting option pricing model is put forward. The analogy option pricing 
model provides a new explanation for the implied volatility skew puzzle. The analogy based 
explanation complements the existing explanation as it is possible to integrate analogy making with 
stochastic volatility and jump diffusion approaches. The paper does that and puts forward analogy 
based option valuation models with stochastic volatility and jumps respectively. In contrast with 
other stochastic volatility and jump diffusion models in the literature, analogy making stochastic 
volatility model generates the skew even when there is zero correlation between the stock price and 
volatility processes, and analogy based jump diffusion can produce the skew even with symmetric 
jumps.  
The analogy model differs minimally from the Black Scholes model due to the introduction 
of one additional variable. The additional variable captures the risk premium (subjective) that the 
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marginal call option investor expects to get from the underlying stock.   It is surprising that such a 
minimally different model can explain a wide variety of phenomena such as implied volatility skew, 
leverage adjusted option returns, superior performance of covered call writing, and worse-than-
expected performance of zero-beta straddles. 
 
  
34 
 
References 
 
Akerlof, G., and Shiller, R. (2009), “Animal Spirits”, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Andersen, T. G., Benzoni, L. and Lund, J. (2002), “An Empirical Investigation of Continuous-Time Equity 
Return Models”,  The Journal of Finance, 57: 1239–1284.  
Bakshi G., Cao, C., Chen, Z. (1997). “Empirical performance of alternative option pricing models”, Journal of 
Finance 52, 2003-2049. 
Barberis, N., and Thaler, R. (2002), “A Survey of Behavioral Finance”, NBER Working Paper No. 9222. 
 
Bates, D. (2000), “Post-‘87 Crash fears in S&P 500 futures options”, Journal of Econometrics, 94, pp. 181-238. 
 
Beber A., Breedan F., and Buraschi A. (2010), “Differences in beliefs and currency risk premiums”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 98, Issue 3, pp. 415-438. 
 
Bhattacharya, J., Goldman D., & Sood, N, (2009), “Market Evidence of Misperceived Mortality Risk”, Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72(1), pp. 452-461. 
 
Black, F., Scholes, M. (1973). “The pricing of options and corporate liabilities”. Journal of Political Economy 
81(3): pp. 637-65 
 
Bollen, N., and Whaley, R. (2004). “Does Net Buying Pressure Affect the Shape of Implied Volatility 
Functions?” Journal of Finance 59(2): 711–53 
Chambers, D. R., Foy, M., Liebner, J., & Lu, Q. (2014), “Index Option Returns: Still Puzzling”, The Review of 
Financial Studies. 
 
Chernov, Mikhail, Ron Gallant, Eric Ghysels, and George Tauchen, 2003, Alternative models of 
stock price dynamics, Journal of Econometrics 116, 225–257. 
Christensen B. J., and Prabhala, N. R. (1998), “The Relation between Realized and Implied Volatility”, Journal 
of Financial Economics Vol.50, pp. 125-150. 
Constantinides, G. M., Jackwerth, J. C., and Savov, A. (2013), “The Puzzle of Index Option Returns”, Review 
of Asset Pricing Studies.  
Coval, J. D., and Shumway, T. (2001), “Expected Option Returns”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, No.3, pp. 983-
1009. 
Derman, E. (2003), “The Problem of the Volatility Smile”, talk at the Euronext Options Conference available 
at http://www.ederman.com/new/docs/euronext-volatility_smile.pdf 
Derman, E, (2002), “The perception of time, risk and return during periods of speculation”. 
Quantitative Finance Vol. 2, pp. 282-296. 
Derman, E., Kani, I., & Zou, J. (1996), “The local volatility surface: unlocking the information in index 
option prices”, Financial Analysts Journal, 52, 4, 25-36 
Derman, E., Kani, I. (1994), “Riding on the Smile.” Risk, Vol. 7, pp. 32-39 
35 
 
Duan, Jin-Chuan, and Wei Jason (2009), “Systematic Risk and the Price Structure of Individual Equity 
Options”, The Review of Financial studies, Vol. 22, No.5, pp. 1981-2006. 
Duan, J.-C., 1995. The GARCH option pricing model. Mathematical Finance 5, 13-32. 
Dumas, B., Fleming, J., Whaley, R., 1998. Implied volatility functions: empirical tests. Journal of Finance 53, 
2059-2106. 
Dupire, B. (1994), “Pricing with a Smile”, Risk, Vol. 7, pp. 18-20 
Emanuel, D. C., and MacBeth, J. D. (1982), “Further Results on the Constant Elasticity of Variance Option 
Pricing Model”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 17, Issue 4, pp. 533-554. 
Fouque, Papanicolaou, Sircar, and Solna (2004), “Maturity Cycles in Implied Volatility” Finance and 
Stochastics, Vol. 8, Issue 4, pp 451-477 
Goltz, F., and Lai, W. N. (2009), “Empirical properties of straddle returns”, The Journal of Derivatives, Vol. 17, 
No. 1, pp. 38-48. 
Heston S., Nandi, S., 2000. A closed-form GARCH option valuation model. Review of Financial Studies 13, 
585-625. 
Heston S., 1993. “A closed form solution for options with stochastic volatility with application to bond and 
currency options. Review of Financial Studies 6, 327-343. 
Hodges, S. D., Neuberger, A. (1989), “Optimal replication of contingent claims under transaction costs”, The 
Review of Futures Markets 8, 222–239  
Hofstadter, D., and Sander, E. (2013), “Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the fuel and fire of thinking”,  
Published by Basic Books, April. 
Hull, J., White, A., 1987. The pricing of options on assets with stochastic volatilities. Journal of Finance 42, 
281-300. 
Jackwerth, J. C., (2000), “Recovering Risk Aversion from Option Prices and Realized Returns”, The Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 13, No, 2, pp. 433-451. 
Lakonishok, J., I. Lee, N. D. Pearson, and A. M. Poteshman, 2007, “Option Market Activity,” 
Review of Financial Studies, 20, 813-857. 
Melino A., Turnbull, S., 1990. “Pricing foreign currency options with stochastic volatility”. Journal of 
Econometrics 45, 239-265 
Miyahara, Y. (2001), “Geometric Levy Process & MEMM Pricing Model and Related Estimation Problems”, 
Asia-Pacific Financial Markets 8, 45–60 (2001) 
Pan, J. (2002), “The jump-risk premia implicit in options: Evidence from an integrated time-series 
Study”, Journal of Financial Economics, 63, pp. 3-50. 
Rennison, G., and Pedersen, N. (2012) “The Volatility Risk Premium”, PIMCO, September. 
Rockenbach, B. (2004), “The Behavioral Relevance of Mental Accounting for the Pricing of Financial 
Options”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 53, pp. 513-527. 
36 
 
Rotheli, T. F. (2010), “Causes of the Financial Crisis: Risk Misperception, Policy Mistakes, and Banks’ 
Bounded Rationality”, Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 39, Issue 2, pp. 119-126. 
Rubinstein, M., 1994. Implied binomial trees. Journal of Finance 49, 771-818. 
Schwert W. G. (1990), “Stock volatility and the crash of 87”. Review of Financial Studies 3, 1 (1990), pp. 77–102 
Siddiqi, H. (2009), “Is the Lure of Choice Reflected in Market Prices? Experimental Evidence based on the 4-
Door Monty Hall Problem”. Journal of Economic Psychology, April.  
Siddiqi, H. (2011), “Does Coarse Thinking Matter for Option Pricing? Evidence from an Experiment” IUP 
Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. VIII, No.2. pp. 58-69 
Siddiqi, H. (2012), “The Relevance of Thinking by Analogy for Investors’ Willingness to Pay: An 
Experimental Study”, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 33, Issue 1, pp. 19-29. 
Soner, H.M., S. Shreve, and J. Cvitanic, (1995), “There is no nontrivial hedging portfolio for 
option pricing with transaction costs”, Annals of Applied Probability 5, 327–355. 
Stein, E. M., and Stein, J. C (1991) “Stock price distributions with stochastic volatility: An analytic approach” 
Review of Financial Studies, 4(4):727–752. 
Wiggins, J., 1987. Option values under stochastic volatility: theory and empirical estimates. Journal of 
Financial Economics 19, 351-372. 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1 
For case 1, when        , the results follow from a direct comparison of (3.4) and (3.5).  
For case 2, when        , the spectrum of possibilities is further divided into three sub-classes 
and the results are proved for each sub-class one by one. The three sub-classes are: (i)   
     
 
, 
(ii)      
     
 
, and (iii)      
     
 
.  
Case 2 sub-class (i):  
     
 
 
If we assume that   
  
     
 
 
 
   
    
     
      , we arrive at a contradiction as follows: 
Substitute     
     
 
 and   
     
 
 above and simplify, it follows that    , which is a 
contradiction as     if the risk premium is positive. 
Case 2 sub-class (ii):      
     
 
 or equivalently    
     
 
 where 
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If we assume that   
  
     
 
 
 
   
    
     
      , we arrive at a contradiction as follows: 
Substitute     
     
 
 and    
     
 
 above and simplify, it follows that      , which is a 
contradiction. 
Case 2 sub-class (iii):      
     
 
 or equivalently    
     
 
 where     
   
     
 
Similar logic as used in the case above leads to a contradiction:      .  
Hence, the analogy price must be larger than the no-arbitrage price if the risk premium is positive 
and there are no transaction costs. 
Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 2 
If         then there is no-arbitrage if the following holds: 
 
 
   
 
 
   
    
 
   
 
 
   
          
 
   
 
 
   
    
 
   
 
 
   
    
Realizing that           
 
   
 
 
   
    
 
   
 
 
   
         and simplifying  
        
 
   
 
 
   
    
 
   
 
 
   
   leads to inequality (3.12).  
If         then there is no-arbitrage if the following holds: 
 
    
     
  
 
   
 
  
   
    
 
   
 
  
   
      
  
     
 
 
 
  
  
    
     
  
 
   
 
  
   
    
 
   
 
  
   
    
Realizing that  
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And simplifying   
  
     
 
 
 
     
    
     
  
 
   
 
  
   
    
 
   
 
  
   
   leads to (3.1). 
 
Appendix C 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Case 1:         
Delta-hedged portfolio is     . In this case,    ,     
     
 
, and        
If the red state is realized,     changes from    to  . If the blue state is realized     also 
changes from    to  . Hence, the growth rate is equal to 
 
 
   in either state. 
Case 2:         
Delta-hedged portfolio is       In this case,   
    
     
,     
     
 
, and  
    
  
     
 
 
 
    
Consider three sub-classes and prove the result for each: (i)   
     
 
, (ii)      
     
 
, and 
(iii)      
     
 
  For the first sub-class the delta-hedged portfolio changes from the initial value 
of  
  
 
 to 
  
 
 in both the red and the blue states. Hence, the growth rate is equal to 
 
 
   in either 
state. For the second and third sub-classes, the delta-hedged portfolio changes from 
               
  
        
 to 
              
  
        
 in both red and blue states. Hence, the growth rate is equal to 
 
 
  . 
 
Appendix D 
 
In the binomial analogy case, the delta-hedged portfolio  
  
  
   grows at the rate     . Divide 
        in n time periods, and with    , the binomial process converges to the geometric 
Brownian motion. To deduce the analogy based PDE consider: 
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Where              and by Ito’s Lemma       
  
  
 
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
      
  
  
   
                      
  
  
    
  
  
 
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
      
  
  
   
            
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
    
         
  
  
      
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
  
               
  
  
 
  
  
 
    
 
   
   
                                                                                      
The above is the analogy based PDE. 
 
Appendix E 
The analogy based PDE derived in Appendix D can be solved by converting to heat equation and 
exploiting its solution. The steps are identical to the derivation of the Black Scholes model with the 
risk free rate  , replaced with    .  
 
Appendix F 
Start by considering the value of a delta hedged portfolio: 
         .  
 
Over a small time interval,   : 
                      (F1) 
 
By Ito’s Lemma (time subscript is suppressed for simplicity): 
   
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
 
   
   
   
   
 
 
    
   
   
      (F2) 
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Substituting (F2) in (F1) and re-arranging: 
      
  
  
     
  
  
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
 
 
    
   
   
    
  
  
       (F3) 
 
Choosing   
  
  
, and realizing that, with analogy making,               , (F3) becomes: 
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(F4) simplifies to: 
  
  
       
  
  
   
  
  
 
 
 
    
   
   
 
 
 
    
   
   
             (F5) 
 
Appendix G 
By following a very similar argument as in appendix F, and using Ito’s lemma for the continuous 
part and an analogous Lemma for the discontinuous part, the following is obtained: 
  
  
       
  
  
 
 
 
    
   
   
                           
 
 
